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Abstract
Public value creation was introduced in 1995 by Mark Moore as a new concept to innovations in public
sectors. Overcoming drawbacks of the Weber’s classical politics bureaucracy divide and avoiding the
pitfalls of New Public Management Moore’s concept appeals to the aims of New Public Governance.
Public Value Creation has been subject of a fierce discussion. In this paper an alternative model is
drawn, in order to eliminate two asserted weaknesses, namely the absence of the public itself at the
judgment of public value and the omission of competing and conflicting interests in the public territory.
Two examples of innovation, derived of the Dutch public housing, are assessed by means of the
proposed model. The assessment results into new insights. The authorization by the political
environment does not guarantee that the chosen innovations are sufficiently legitimized. If the strategy
has a weak relation to the public service purpose and practice the outcome might be judged negatively
by the public environment, in spite of eventual approval by the political customers. Secondly, unjustified
authorization of intended break-through innovations entails high risk of failure in public sectors. The
failure is indicated by a massive waste of public resources and a loss of institutional trust.
Introduction and questions
Mark Moore’s seminal book ‘Public Value Creation’ (1995) has made an appeal on the innovative
aspiration of practitioners. Moore et al. define innovation as:
“Those changes worth recognizing as innovation should be…new to the organization, be large
enough, general enough and durable enough to appreciably affect the operations or character
of the organization.” (Moore, Sparrow, & Spelman, 1997, p. 276)
We start with an approach of innovation in public sectors, based on unambiguous taxonomies. Firstly,
the public context is taken into account. Hartley (2005, p. 29) discerns the roles of a) the public
managers b) the policy makers, and c) the population. This in-between position of the executives of
service providers is also applicable to nonprofit sectors, where the nonprofit organization have the
capability to bridge the gap between governmental bodies and the clients in an innovative way (Badelt,
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22003, p. 149). One role has to be added, namely the one of the professionals, to be distinguished from
the one from the public manager. Since Lipsky (1980) the street-level professional are got in the picture
of scientists. The question whether managers and professionals have opposing interests especially in
situations of organizational change is subject of an ongoing debate (Noordergraaf & Steijn, 2013).
Anyway, their roles are principally different. Hartley (2005, p. 28) points out three options for the
position of innovation: bottom up, top down and lateral. Each option has particular advantage and
disadvantages, depending on the kind of innovation.
Hartley (2005, p. 28) propose a taxonomy based on features of innovations in public sectors:
 Product innovation-new products.
 Service innovation-new ways in which services are provided to users.
 Process innovation-new ways in which organizational processes are designed.
 Position innovation-new contexts or users.
 Strategic innovation-new goals or purposes of the organization (for example community
policing).
 Governance innovation-new forms of citizen engagement, and democratic institutions.
 Rhetorical innovation-new language and new concepts.
Hartley (2005, p. 29) makes a distinction between improvement and innovation, which however appears
to be mixed up with the geographical levels of dissemination. Moore proposes two models of
innovation, the first break-through innovations and the second innovative (learning) organizations and
continuous improvement (Moore, 2005, p. 45). Hartley (2005, p. 31) elaborates the difference between
improvement and innovation in a matrix, simplified presented in the next table.
Table 1 Improvement innovation matrix derived from Hartley (2005)
continuous improvement
but no innovation
both innovation and
improvement
neither innovation
nor improvement
innovation
but no improvement
Examples of the right beneath quadrant are among others “increased choices but not desired by service
users” and “loss of performance due to learning curve and operational bugs”. These examples fit in a
vision which diverges from the “traditional bias of the literature that innovation is necessarily
functional”. (Hartley, 2005, pp. 31, 27).
3This vision brings us to the question under which conditions innovations in public sector succeed or fail.
Moore’s ‘stategic triangle’ includes three conditions a) clarifying and specifying the strategic goals and
public value outcomes, b) building of operational capacity to innovate, and c) and creating an
authorizing environment (Benington & Moore, 2011, p. 4). However the public value creation concept is
contested seriously by some authors, so the critique might give better clues to success and failure of
innovation in public sector. Another question is whether it is adequate to base a model on tradeoffs
between abstract conditions. To wit, actors get involved in interactions and transactions, each with
their particular roles. An aim of the paper is to draw a model for the assessment of innovation in public
sectors that eliminates weaknesses of the Moore model. A next question is whether this alternative
model is suited for the assessment of innovation in public sector.
A sample of innovative practices is taken from the Dutch public housing sector. The deliberateness of
the sampling (pairing a success to a failure), the small size (n=2) of the sample and the specific context
are conditions under which a valid and fair comparative testing of models is not possible. For that
reason the final question is what new insights are acquired by the alternative assessment of these
specific examples of public sector innovation.
Critique on Moore’s public value creation concept
Moore’s concept of public value creation has become subject of a scientific controversy, in which
objections are made by Rhodes and Wanna ( (Rhodes & Wanna, 2007; Alford, 2008; Rhodes & Wanna,
2008). Benington and Moore (2011, p. 18) summarize the objections of Rhodes and Wanna (2007):
1. “that it is unclear whether public value ideas are based on normative or empirical reasoning
(…)
2. that it embraces too broad and loose a definition of the public manager (…)
3. that is not applicable to Westminster-style democracies, where there is a sharper
distinction between the roles of elected politicians and appointed managers, than in the US
and other systems (…)
4. that it assumes too benign a view of public managers and public organizations - and ignores
the ‘dark side’ of the state’s regulatory activity, and the asymmetrical power relations
between state officials, clients, citizens and other interest groups (…)
5. that it gives a dangerous primacy to entrepreneurial public managers in shaping the content
of policies and programmes, at the expense of elected politicians and political parties (…)
6. that it defers too much to private sector models of management and fails to acknowledge
the very different goals and accountabilities of public management within a democratic
political framework (…)
7. that it downgrades the importance of party politics, and raises public managers to the
status of Platonic guardians and arbiters of the public interest, instead of recognizing that
public value is highly contested territory, in which competing and conflicting interests can
only be negotiated between elected politicians through the democratic political process.
4Point 1 would be surmountable if a sound empirical core remains if the concept is stripped from its
positive appeal. Points 2 and 3 are not to the point in this paper, because the cases are located in a
other style of democracy with a large share of nonprofit organizations in the delivery of public services
(Hupe, Meijs, & Vorthoren, 2000).The objection of a alleged ignorance of the ‘dark side’ (Alford, 2008,
p. 363; Rhodes & Wanna, 2008, p. 365) (point 4) would be a problem if failures occur while the Moore
model predicts success or if public managers claim successes while politicians, citizens or both groups
contest the results of the innovation. Rhodes and Wanna (2007) presume that only politics are potential
victims of self-interested (point 5) or self-referential (point 7) public managers, while also clients,
organizations, the public and other interest groups could suffer from bad innovations in public sectors.
The objection that Moore too much relies on private sector models of innovations was forestalled by
publications in which this problem was solved (Moore, 2000, p. 189; Moore & Khagram, 2004). If there is
a problem on point 6 it is that strategic management has a bias for break-through innovations with
redefinition of primary goals or objectives and gives a focus on the strategic level at which clients get
easily out of sight.
This last point is made by Symes (1999, p. 162), who proposes “that customer-service-type interactions
with conceptual customers will provide the key to service quality improvements”, and that “greater
attention to meeting customer needs at the operational level (…) could open up opportunities for
greater citizen participation and evaluation of public programs”. Benington and Moore refer to
Meynhardt (2009, p. 195) who addresses the unclear treatment of the ‘public good’ question in Moore’s
book, just like Rhodes and Wanna (2007, p. 421). Kingma (2003, p. 59) points at the situation in many
nonprofit sectors where private goods are semi-publicly delivered with the intention to produce positive
externalities. Hartley (2005, p. 34) writes about “the context of complexity for public service
organizations (…) that they are embedded in society, producing not only benefits (and obligations) for
individuals but also providing public goods and services, establishing collective efficiency, and creating
collective rules and purposes”. Moore reduces this very complexity by abstracting the public goods
creation from the public service delivery to clients. This reduction causes problems for the interpretation
of the concept, and, also to the application of the concept into divergent ‘businesses’ of public service
delivery.
Rhetorical innovation (2005, p. 28) reflects an aspect of what Stoker (2006, p. 55) regards as a specific
dilemma of public value management, “encouraging a talking shop rather than an action-oriented
management”. As remedy Stoker promotes “good practice and and stakeholder pluralist review to
ensure that the system delivers effective stakeholder democracy and management”. Adherence to
political customers, as put forward by Moore, will be rather a cause than a remedy to talking shops of
innovation.
Finally Meynhardt (2009, p. 195) discusses the mimicking of shareholder value: “Its prima facie-
attractiveness also stems from the rhetoric mimicking of the private sector idea of shareholder value.
But obviously, in order to be able to challenge other approaches we need a more integrated notion of
value than that used for measuring shareholders wealth.” Benington and Moore (2011, p. 5) write about
negotiations and tradeoffs between the three factors of the strategic triangle, associating to the world
5of shareholder value. However, it is very interesting to observe the actual transactions in a public
innovation practice. What resources are exchanged, what material and immaterial goods are delivered?
An alternative model for the assessment of innovation in public sectors
In this paragraph a design of an alternative model for public sector innovation is presented. The design is
based on insights from differing scientific disciplines, starting with philosophy. Public value creation has
more implication than the strategic management scope and one actor perspective are able to comprise.
In his critique, Meynhardt (2009, p. 198) initiates ontological issues. It is important to have a clear
philosophical base, in order to maintain a straight line of arguing. The model is based on principles of
the pragmatic philosophy of Dewey and Mead, providing the following scheme of human agency
(Jacobs, 1993, p. 74):
Individual – Society – Individual2
Dewey en Bentley (1949, p. 97) propose three concept for the connection of the individual to society:
 Self-action. In this paper self-action regards the intentions, perceptions, and judgment of the
actor.
 Interaction between actors
 Transaction, regarding the exchange of goods, ideas, and definitions of the situation etc.
A postulate is that there is always a chain running from the individual actor who decides and acts at the
public delivery of the goods and the individuals, both clients/customers and public. Executives might
have that idea that the chain stops at the exchange, but the public will involve judgments on the
interaction and self-action of the executives and employees in its valuation of the deliverance. The
discovery of the existence of the closed chain is clearly illustrated by the Brentspar case of Shell, when
Shell thought it was only a matter of the company itself how to get rid of worn out oil-platform and was
waylaid by an outrage of public indignation. The judgments by the public involve the valuation of the
interaction and self-action3 of the delivering actor. If a customer feels bad about the attitude and
communication by the delivering actor, he or she will have a negative valuation of the transaction, even
if the quality of the transaction is not subject of discussion.
The following figure is a flow chart in which all possible connections are drawn.
2 Jacobs opposes this scheme to those from Bourdieu (structure – habitus – structure) and Giddens (action –
structure – action)
3 In public media there are many attributions to the self-action of bankers and public sector managers, like greed
napoleonic dreams and narcissism.
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Habermas has argued that there are two levels: the level of everyday life (‘Lebenswelt’) and the level of
the Systems of society (Habermas, 1982, p. 182). This distinction is familiar to Lipsky’s street-level
(Lipskey, 1980), where public organization officials are interacting with clients. Habermas (1982, p. 229)
assumes that Lebenswelt and System might be decoupled. This concept of decoupling is also proposed
by the institutional sociologists (Meyer & Rowan, 2000, pp. 58, 61). Meyer and Rowan draw the
decoupling between organizations and an institutional field, arguing that supervisors on these fields are
not really interested in the results of the operations of the organizations. So their decoupling implies
that the connection between organization and field is weak. However the fields is used as place where
executives find new ideas to implement top down in their organizations.
The idea of decoupling shed a light on public value creation. Managers think out innovations which
involve service to the clients and the production of positive externalities to the citizens in general. They
conceive their innovations in close connection to their authorizing environment, including peer and
political customers. We follow Moore (2005, pp. 2-3), assuming the institutional fields includes a diffuse
collection of actors involved in the particular public service. The political customers should be
legitimized by the fact that they are democratically elected. When this way of innovation is setup in the
model, several connections are dropped.
Executive
Institutional
field:
Peers and
Political
principals
Organization
Public:
Clients and
Citizens
7Figure 2 Decoupled mode of public sector innovations model
There is a connection between the top level and the bottom but the connections are running one-way.
Political support for innovations crowds out the public support, in what is called a closed shop of policy
innovation (Commission-Dijsselbloem, 2009, p. 5). This institutional innovation reflects inequality of
power and is a contradiction to Habermas’ ideal of communicative action.
The working of an institutional field in relation to innovation is not very clear in literature, because of its
diffuse cast and the informal interactions between actors. It contains a multi-agent system populated by
the executives of public service providers, connected to each other in several networks. If the actors in a
network operate in a cooperative mode communities of practice (Wenger, 1998) could develop shared
new practices (Brandsen, 2001, p. 61). When the interaction is dominated by competition instead of
trust, limits to communities of practice are observed (Roberts, 2006), like closure of information
exchange and indifference concerning the environment in which the practices are located.
A competitive conception of innovation on the institutional field assumes the working of reputation.
Through presentation of a successful practice on the field, the reputation of the executive among peers,
supervisors, and political principals will rise to a higher level which is an incentive to be innovative. A
successful practice will be transferred to working situations of peers. Competition on innovation divides
a sector in forerunners and followers (Brandsen, 2001): “Some people are more creative than others.
Similarly, some organizations have the people, the culture, the structure or the funds to come up with
more ideas than others. It is one of the most important assets in a competitive environment.”
Executive
Institutional
field:
Peers and
Political
principals
Organization
Public:
Clients and
Citizens
8Success attribution by peers and prove of effectiveness of innovations are not the same. In figure 2 the
assessment is probably located on the institutional level, inasmuch the judgments of the clients and
members of the organizations do no pervade to the institutional field other than through the verbal
accounts of the executive.
Ortmann and Schlessinger (2003, p. 86) assert that reputation is not a good guide to predict
organizational performance, particularly if practices are new and idiosyncratic. Rindova et al. find that
prominence in the minds of stakeholders is a stronger carrier of reputation than the stakeholders’
perception of an organization as able to produce quality goods (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever,
2005). In their words ‘being known’ contributes more to reputation than ‘being good’. Impression
management and controversial actions are the very way to success in institutional environments
(Elsbach & Sutton, 1992).
Considered so, one could suppose that innovation in a public sector is doomed to fail as soon as the
processes on institutional are leading the executives and their political principals. An alternative route is
thinkable. Executives need to have a strong public service ethos (Aldridge & Stoker, 2002). The
performance of the organization in service to the clients and society is the leading criterion, which
requires temporal and peer performance comparison. The executive guide the organizations in a slow
and laborious way to attain success with innovations in the working field. Success attribution on the
institutional field requires confirmation from clients and local society. If success is proven, the
executives gather support and approval from the institutional fields which they share with the members
of their organization. Thus. innovation in a public sectors require and strong grounding in (local)
practices and feedback by the public.
Two cases of innovation in the Dutch public housing sector
In the Dutch public housing sector the delivery is the prerogative of housing corporations, private
organizations embedded in public law. Since the early nineties the Dutch government has promoted the
autonomy of the housing corporations, expecting that doing so housing corporations would become
more responsible and innovative. The policy is implemented by a modus operandi that nowadays would
be considered as governance innovation and new public governance. This policy has had a promising
start in the nineties (Koffijberg, 2005), a doubtful continuation since 2002 (Koolma H. M., 2008) and a
breakpoint at the end of the past decade. Since 2009 the Dutch public housing sector is in serious
trouble. Besides the consequences of the worldwide financial crisis the sector is suffering from an own
crisis. A sequence of real estate and banking adventures, integrity violations and excessive wages have
caused a loss of public credit and reprisals by political actors.
From this sector we assess two cases of innovation. The first one regards a shared development of a
quality system for the deliverance of public housing (KWH4). The second one concerns a remarkable
attempt to create a landmark in a deprived part of the city of Rotterdam. The landmark is a renovated
4 KHW means quality centre housing corporations rental sector
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youth and the attractiveness of the south of Rotterdam as economically vitalized residential area.
The number in the text of the two following paragraphs refer to the arrows in the flow charts.
The KWH quality system
In the beginning of the nineties a small network of 5 housing corporations in The Hague region agreed
(1) on the importance of the quality of service (KWH historie, 2013). They started a foundation that
supports (2/3) the development of the quality system in the organizations. After a process of trail-and-
error agreement on a common solution is found in a quality that involves evaluation by tenants (4/5).
This is an important difference in comparison to ISO 9000 approaches which were tried elsewhere. The
solution (6) is presented at sessions with colleagues in the Hague region and later on national stages (7).
The quality system is proven in practice and in interaction with clients before it received success
attribution on the institutional field. The dissemination has had a long run (Aedes, 2000). Nowadays
almost the half of the housings corporations follows this practice which is generally appraised as a
successful innovation and as proof that public housing has a good service level (Mossel, 2008). The
foundation is transformed in a co-operative association. Ratings are public and in temporal and peer
comparison all corporations try every to improve their service level. There is no data that gives evidence
of the creation of positive externalities other than the increase of institutional trust.
Figure 3 The process of the KWH innovation
Executive
Institutional
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Political
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Organization
Public:
Clients and
Citizens
3 6
1
5
4
7
2
10
KWH is both a service innovation as a process-innovation. It is a both a learning improvement process as
a break-through innovation, because it breaks with the idea that the organizations are self-assessor as
the quality of their service is concerned. In Moore’s vision it will not be strategic enough. However, the
reciprocal interaction with the clients is a competitive strength of housing corporations in comparison to
other land lords and governmental service units, thus it could be inidicated as a strategic innovation. It
has been a bottom-up innovation, facilitated by a lateral initiative. Quality systems were not required by
the Dutch government. Financial support was not given nor other resources. A small community of
practice has evolved to a general practice, in a way the suits well community-based organizations.
The Rotterdam steam ship
The housing corporation Woonbron buys in 2005 a decayed steam ship from the municipality of
Rotterdam, after a permit by the Dutch government for this remarkable investment (1 /2). The business
case comprise a restoration of the ship, development of a hotel, restaurants and a conference center. In
the realm of housing a short stay facility would be developed with 400 places for deprived youth.
Woonbron has a strategic alliance with a institute for vocational education, the Albeda college, in order
to give an impact to the level of education in the southern part of Rotterdam. The argumentation of the
executive of Woonbron is that the situation in this area of Rotterdam is so serious that an
unconventional break of approach is required. It is meant to be an icon for an economical revival of the
area (Dossier-29453, p. 94/24). Woonbron was promoting a shift from public housing to empowerment
of clients and citizens (Kromwijk & Scherpenisse, 2003; Zijlstra, 2011, p. 20).
The further course of the project is discussed more than 20 times in Dutch parliament (Dossier-29453).
Woonbron reserved a budget of 6 million euro. A commercial counterpart and the Albeda college
withdraw almost immediately from the project, so Woonbron is the own company in the project. The
removal of asbestos is very expensive, and during the project the aim is shifted to a full restoration of
this example of Rotterdam heritage (CFV, 2011, p. 15). The political support for the project both on local
as national level is ongoing until 2008 when the costs exceed 200 million euro. From that point
Woonbron asserts that the value of the ship in full glory will easily cover the costs, so it will be a
remunerative investment. In April of 2008 the agency that has guaranteed the loans recalls its guarantee
(Dossier-29453, p. 83). A task force comprising the state department and the national agencies try to
rescue Woonbron from a default (WWI, 2008). The ship and a 6.000 units of the housing stock of
Woonbron have to be sold and the valuation of the ship is financially restated in step to 40 million euro,
inplying a withdrawal of 220 million of the resources of the organization (3). In 2009 the board of
supervisors withdraws under heavy pressure of the minister. When some parliamentarians request for a
dismissal of the chief executive, the municipality of Rotterdam tries to intervene in the decision of the
Dutch parliament by sending a letter. This intervention fails, and the chief executive decides to withdraw
with a ransom of 425.000 euro (Dossier-29453, p. 199)5.
5 It is easy to detect managerial entrenchment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989), entrapment (Hart, 1990), and financial
misinformation due to overconfidence (Schrand & Zechman, 2008) in the project. The question is however, why
this strategic innovation has not succeeded.
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At the moment Woonbron says to have an agreement with a buyer for the ship at a price of 29,9 million
euro (Wijbenga, 2012). The new CEO of Woonbron states: “A housing corporation should not on this
scale invest public housing capital into semi-commercial project, which do not increase housing quality
nor expand the public housing stock (translation HMK)”. The short stay facility is not realized, so no
direct public housing service is achieved by the project.
The innovation is set-up as a bright example of public value creation. The production of externalities is
directly addressed. Ex ante, this has to be appraised as a break-through innovation of a public
entrepreneur. The authorizing environment is served very well. The project is received so
enthusiastically (Dossier-29453, p. 94), that permission is given in conflict with the regulation for sideline
activities (Bestuursdienst, 2001). This regulation required a risk assessment which was not filed. The
regulation has an article that concerns the production of externalities. A housing corporation is allowed
to invest in societal project only if the corporation owns houses in the proximity. A question is why
Woonbron would not rather invest at places where it would profit from the externalities. Woonbron had
other problem areas in the cities of Dordrecht and Delft and on the north bank of the river Maas. Clients
of Woonbron were skeptical about the project (5), but were assured by the chief executive (6) that the
public housing service would not suffer by the losses on the project (Dossier-29453, p. 94). An
assessment of the externalities is made (Deuten, Lubbe, Kam, Marlet, & Plomp, 2010) but made on
exaggerated assumptions about the number of visitors (Stadsontwikkeling, 2011).
The untimely authorization by the minister blocked due assessment of the project and covered
thereafter a course of action in which the investment raised from the budgeted 6 million euro till more
than 200 million (Dossier-29453, p. 94). Although there was warm support among citizens in Rotterdam
for the rehabilitation of this piece of heritage and the CEO received signs of admiration on the
institutional field (CFV, 2011, pp. 15-18), there was no notion that the public outside Rotterdam would
see the project as megalomaniac and a waste of public resources. The sentiment in the public media (7)
was even more negative than for the cases of integrity violation at other housing corporations (Koolma
H. M., 2011). The project is one of a sequence of managerial failures that has damaged the public
reputation of housing corporations (Aedes, 2012). Support by the public for strategic innovations in
public service appears to be totally misjudged by ministers and political parties. So authorization by the
political principal does not guarantee legitimacy in face of the public.
The innovation process is mapped in next figure. Remarkably, the innovation had no connection to the
organization6 other than that the resources of the organization were used to cover the losses on the
project. From the viewpoint of the organization the project was top down. The interaction between the
executive and the political principal at the start of the project was informal (Dossier-29453, p. 94) and
had the appearance of a lateral connection. Since the institution of the task force in 2008, the relation
became top-down, restoring the formal hierarchy.
6 Woonbron instituted a special Ltd. for the project, the ‘Rederij Rotterdam BV’
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Figure 4 Innovation process of the Rotterdam steamship
In Moore’s model the organizational capacity is a condition for success. Woonbron appeared to have no
organizational capacity whatsoever to succeed in this special project. However, at the start of the
project Woonbron was well-known and reputed for its innovative power (Laverman, 2005). The proof of
organizational capacity and an early-detection of risks are required when strategic innovation are
deliberated and started. Regarding the taxonomy, the steamship project is both a position and a
strategic innovation. Because of the fact that entrepreneurship only had associations with personal
audacity and risk-taking (Dossier-29453, p. 94/31), while skills common for entrepreneurs like
contracting, project managent, calculating, and cost control lacked completely, the entrepreneurship of
this housing corporation can be classified as rhetorical.
Conclusion and discussion
This paper proposes an alternative approach of innovation in sectors of public service. It presents a
interaction model, with an optional decoupling between institutional fields and working field. In
comparison to the model of Mark Moore the public is added, comprising both clients and public. The
assessment results into new insights. The idea of Moore to address innovations to production of the
public goods instead of improvement of the running business is tried in the Rotterdam steamship case.
The project resulted in consequences which are contrary to the intentions. One case is not enough to
reject the proposition of Moore. However, it makes clear that a decoupling between public service and
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externalities appears to be problematic. The twofold decoupling illustrates how institutionalization of
innovation can be counterproductive (Selznick, 1957, p. 17; Meyer & Rowan, 2000) and create confusion
about “who public services are supposed to serve and risk losing sight of why such universal provision is
necessary” (Aldridge & Stoker, 2002, p. 6) .
Further, the authorization by the political environment does not guarantee that the chosen innovations
are sufficiently legitimized. If the strategy has a weak relation to the public service purpose and practice
the outcome might be judged negatively by the public environment, in spite of eventual approval by the
political customers. Secondly, unjustified authorization of intended strategic innovations entails high risk
of failure in public sectors. The failure is indicated by a massive waste of public resources and a loss of
institutional trust.
The public value concept is based on strategic management which suggests that public service managers
need to compete with their innovations. The first case is based on inter-organizational trust. The
undisputed reputation of the organization in the second case was indeed a bad predictor of
performance. These three observations encourage to study the relation between trust, reputation and
legitimacy in the context of the governance of public sectors.
The cases date from different periods since the governance innovation in the sector which gave the
housing corporations more autonomy and the executives more discretionary power. The first one
starting in the nineties has gradually become a successful innovation with a slow learning curve, the
second one dated one decade later and was an example of a project of conceptual thinking and doing
without trail-and-error. The two opposing cases reflect the distinction Rhodes and Wanna (2007, p. 417)
make between the low risk of incrementalism and emerging strategies on the one hand and the high risk
of transformative leadership and adventurism on the other hand.
In a memo (Jong, 2013) to the commission of the Dutch parliament the question is raised why the
corporations started the new area of autonomy with improvement while serious failures have emerged
and coincided at the end of the last decade. The question brings into mind the life cycles of institutional
isomorphism of Powell (1991, p. 186). Public value creation seems to be prone to isomorphism between
public service providers and political policy makers. This might be a new clue to failure in
institutionalized public sectors.
References
14
Aedes. (2012). Toezicht met bite. Hilversum: Aedes vereniging van woningcorporaties.
Aldridge, R., & Stoker, G. (2002). Advancing a public service ethos. London: New Local Government
Network.
Alford, J. (2008). The Limits to Traditional Public Administration, or Rescuing Public Value from
Misinterpretation. The Australian Journal Public Administration, Vol 67(3) , 357-366.
Badelt, C. (2003). Entrepreneurship in Nonprofit Organizations. In H. K. Anheier, & A. Ben-Ner, The Study
of the Nonprofit Enterprise: Theories and Approaches (pp. 139-159). New York: Kluwer
Academic/Plenum Publisher.
Benington, J., & Moore, M. H. (2011). Public Value in Complex and Changing Times. In J. Benington, & M.
H. Moore, Public Value: Theory and Practice (pp. 1-30). Basingstoke UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bestuursdienst. (2001, November 5). MG-2001-26. Toepassing van toezicht (meldingsplichtige besluiten
nevenactiviteiten), verkoop van huurwoningen en invoering EURO . The Hague: Department of VROM.
Brandsen, T. (2001). A Wilderness of Mirrors: Quasi-markets, housing and the welfare state
(dissertation). Tilburg.
CFV. (2011). Jaarverslag 2010. Naarden: Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting.
Commission-Dijsselbloem. (2009). Report of parliamentarian enquiry of education reform. The Hague:
www.parlement.com.
Deuten, J., Lubbe, M., Kam, G. d., Marlet, G., & Plomp, H.-N. (2010). De maatschappelijke effecten van
De Rotterdam. Rotterdam: SEV.
Dewey, J., & Bentley, A. F. (1949). Knowing the Known. Boston: Beacon Press.
Dossier-29453. (n.d.). Overheid.nl. Retrieved March 25, 2013, from Officiële bekendmakingen
Parlementaire stukken: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/zoeken/parlementaire_documenten
(Search keys dossier 29453 / Woonbron)
Elsbach, K. D., & Sutton, R. I. (1992). Acquiring Organizational Legitimacy Through Illegitimate Actions: a
Marriage of Institutional and Impression Management Theories. The Academy of Management Journal,
Vol. 35(4) , 699-738.
Habermas, J. (1982). Theroie des kommunikatieen Handelns, Band 2: Zur Kritik der functionalistischen
Vernunft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Hart, P. '. (1990). Groupthink in government - A study of small groups and policy failure (dissertation).
Leiden: Universiteit van Leiden.
Hartley, J. (2005). Innovation in Governance and Public Services: Past and Present. Public Money &
Management, Vol. 25(1) , 27-34.
15
Hupe, P. L., Meijs, L. C., & Vorthoren, M. H. (2000). Hybrid governance - the impact of the nonprofit
sector in the Nethderlands. Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam.
Jacobs, D. (1993). De sythese van handelings- en systeemtheorie in de structuratietheorie van Antony
Giddens en de praxeologie van Pierre Bourdieu (dissertation). Gent: Vakgroep Sociologie Universiteit
Gent.
Jong, R. d. (2013). De balans verstoord. The Hague: Aedes vereniging van woningcorporaties.
Kingma, B. R. (2003). Public Good Theories of the Nonprofit Sector. In H. K. Anheier, & A. Ben-Ner, The
Study of the Nonprofit Enterprise: Theories and Approaches (pp. 53-65). New York: Kluwer
Academic/Plenum Publishers.
Koffijberg, J. J. (2005). Getijden van beleid: omslagpunten in de volkshuisvesting - Over de rol van
hiërarchie en netwerken bij grote veranderingen (dissertatie). Delft: DUP.
Koolma, H. M. (2011). The rise and fall of credibility. NIG Working conference. Rotterdam: Netherlands
Institute of Governance.
Koolma, H. M. (2008). Verhalen en prestaties - een onderzoek naar het gedrag van woningcorporaties.
Rotterdam: Rik Koolma VH&RO.
Kromwijk, M., & Scherpenisse, R. v. (2003). Wonen moet meer van mensen worden: een essay over
bouwen en wonen in de 21e eeuw. Building Business .
KWH historie. (2013). Retrieved March 28, 2013, from KWH:
http://www.kwh.nl/templates/content.aspx?PageID=16
Laverman, W. (2005). Winnaars Reputatie Monitor: nieuw zijn Buck en Groningen, opnieuw TCN en
Woonbron. Building Business November .
Lipskey, M. (1980). Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemma of the Individual in Public Services. New York:
Russell Sage Foundation.
Magazine, A. (2000). Corporatieadvies.nl. Retrieved March 25, 2013, from
http://www.corporatieadvies.nl/index.php/publicaties/alle-artikelen-op-auteur/49-a-c/351-kwh-
evolueert-naar-kwaliteitscentrum.html
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (2000). Institutionalized Organizations - Formal Structure as Myth and
Ceremony. In W. W. Powell, & P. J. DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (pp. 41
- 62). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Meynhardt, T. (2009). Public Value Inside: What is Public Value Creation. International Journal of Public
Administration Vol. 32(3-4) , 192-219.
Moore, M. H. (2005). Break-Through Innovations and Continuous Improvement: Two Different Models
of Innovative Processes in the Public Sector. Public Money & Management, Vol. 25(1) , 43-50.
16
Moore, M. H. (1995). Creating public value - Strategic management in government. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Moore, M. H. (2000). Managing for Value: Organizational Strategy in For-Profit, Nonprofit, and
Governmental Organizations. Nonprofit and Vluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 29(183) , 183-204.
Moore, M. H., & Khagram, S. (2004). On Creating Public Value: What Busienss Might Learn form
Government About Strategic Management. Cambridge MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government.
Moore, M. H., Sparrow, M., & Spelman, W. (1997). Innovation in policing: From production line to job
shops. In A. Altchuler, & R. Behn, Innovation in American Government (pp. 274-298). Washington DC:
Brookings Institution.
Mossel, H.-J. v. (2008). Securing high performance maintenance service delivery. In M. Koopman, H.-J. v.
Mossel, & A. Straub, Performance measurement in the Dutch social rented sector (pp. 117-132). Delft:
IOS Press BV.
Noordergraaf, M., & Steijn, B. (2013). Professionals under pressure. The Reconfiguration of Professional
Work in Changing Public Services. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Ortmann, A., & Schlessinger, M. (2003). Trust, Repute, and the Role of the Nonprofit Enterprise. In H. K.
Anheier, & A. Ben-Ner, The Study of the Nonprofit Enterprise (pp. 77-114). New York: Kluwer
Academic/Plenum.
Powell, W. W. (1991). Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis. In W. W. Powell, & P. J. DiMaggio,
The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (pp. 183-203). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rhodes, R. A., & Wanna, J. (2008). Stairways to Heaven: A Reply to Alford. The Australian Journal of
Public Administration Vol. 67(3) , 367-370.
Rhodes, R. A., & Wanna, J. (2007). The Limits to Public Value, or Rescuing Responsible Government from
the Platonic Guardians. The Australian Journal of Public Administration Vol. 66(4) , 406-421.
Rindova, V. P., Williamson, I. O., Petkova, A. P., & Sever, J. M. (2005). Being Good or Being Known: An
Empirical Examination of the Dimensions, Antecedents, and Consequences of Organizational Reputation.
The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 48(6) , 1033-1049.
Roberts, J. (2006). Limitis to communities of practice. Journal of Management Vol. 43(3) , 623-639.
Schrand, C. M., & Zechman, S. L. (2008). Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope to Fraud.
Financial Accounting and Reporting Section. Chicago: Chicago Booth School of Business Research.
Selznick, P. (1957). Leadership in Administration. New York: Harper & Row.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1989). Management entrenchment: The case of manager-specific
investments. Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 25(1) , 123-139.
17
Stadsontwikkeling. (2011, Augustus 8). Bezoekersaantallen diverse Rotterdamse attractiepunten, 2004
t/m 2010. Rotterdam: Centrum voor Onderzoek en Statistiek.
Stoker, G. (2006). Public Value Management: A New Narrative for Networked Governance. The American
Review of Public Administration vol. 36(41) , 41-57.
Symes, A. (1999). Crreating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government by Mark Moore
reviewed. International Public Management Review Vol. 2(1) , 158-167.
Wenger, E. (1998). Communities of Practice: Learning, meaning, and identity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Wijbenga, B. (2012, November 2). Verkoop stoomschip Rotterdam. Letter to colleagues . Rotterdam:
Woonbron.
WWI. (2008, May 7). Kort verslag over Woonbron, CFV en WWI inzake SS Rotterdam. Department of
VROM/WWI.
Zijlstra, S. (2011). Klantgestuurd voorraadbeleid en empowerment (dissertation). Delft: Technical
University of Delft.
